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The Pro Se Dilemma: Can Too Many Rights Make a
Wrong?
"Americans have many rights, but not enough lefts."
Guillermo Lozada'
These are my grandfather's words, spoken to me so that I might
be grateful for the unearned benefits of the citizenship that was my
birthright. These words embody his belief that rights and duties are
inseparable, that no one should take more than he gives. He could
never understand how the same constitution that granted him
unparalleled opportunity could also tolerate flag burning,2 hate
speech,3 and public advocacy of violent and criminal behavior. 4
Therefore, he often questioned the social cost of giving people so
many rights. His concerns reflect those of the courts, whose task it is
to balance personal liberties with the societal goals that offset them.
In the criminal setting, there are many liberties granted to an
accused.5 One such liberty, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to waive assistance of counsel and proceed pro se, has already been
held by the Supreme Court to outweigh the government's interests in
protecting the defendant from the prosecutorial process.6 However,
when a defendant proceeds pro se in a death penalty case, the
government's interests in fairly imposing the death penalty adds more
weight to its interests in protecting the defendant. Because the
defendant's life is at stake, his choice to proceed pro se complicates
the difficult task of balancing his autonomy interests with the
government's interests in maintaining the fairness and integrity of the
trial.
In United States v. Len Davis,7 the Fifth Circuit had to decide
whether to allow the defendant, Len Davis, to proceedpro se during
the sentencing phase of his capital murder case. Due to Davis's
unique trial strategy, whereby he would risk his life for the acquittal
he sought, the government's interest in avoiding an arbitrary
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1. Guillermo Lozada, now an American citizen, is a Mexican immigrant. He
is currently living in Houston, Texas.
2. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989); United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 110 S.Ct. 2404 (1990).
3. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992).
4. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827 (1969).
5. Most of these are contained in the Bill of Rights, specifically, Amendments
Four, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight.
6. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975).
7. United States v. Len Davis, No. 01-30656, slip op. *7 (5th Cir. July 17,
2001).
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imposition of the death penalty was uncommonly strong. Len Davis
believed that legal errors had occurred in his first trial and that the
district and appellate courts would take his case more seriously if he
was facing a death sentence. Therefore, to elicit a higher level of
scrutiny, he chose to help the prosecution obtain a death sentence by
not presenting mitigating evidence, nor any other defense, during
the penalty phase of his capital trial.8 In order to avoid a blind
imposition of the death penalty, the trial judge appointed counsel to
present mitigating evidence. However, with one last candle to blow
out before making his final death wish, Len Davis filed an
interlocutory appeal with the Fifth Circuit, whereupon his pro se
right was reinstated.
As this case demonstrates, the government's interest in
maintaining the integrity of the trial and the fairness of the death
penalty may conflict with the defendant's interest in proceedingpro
se. In general, the court must allow the defendant to proceedpro se
in all but the rarest cases.9 At the same time, however, the court's
power to control the scope and maintain the integrity of the trial
must not be unduly compromised. Though these interests are
competing, they are not mutually exclusive. In other words,
although a defendant's choice to proceed pro se may be damaging
to his case, the court does not necessarily compromise the
government's interests by honoring his decision, however
misguided it may be. Thus, the central question in United States v.
Len Davis was whether Len Davis's risky trial strategy required a
departure from the general rule that a defendant should be allowed
to proceed pro se during his criminal trial. Although the Fifth
Circuit reached the correct conclusion-that the trial judge should
not have revoked Davis's pro se right-it did not adequately
address the novel issues with which it was presented: (1) whether
Davis's conviction cut off his pro se right, (2) whether Davis's pro
se strategy of foregoing the presentation of mitigating evidence was
precluded by the Eighth Amendment bar against arbitrary and
8. In his appellate brief to the Fifth Circuit, Davis's counsel wrote:
"[b]elieving that legal errors that led to his conviction will be examined more
scrupulously if he has a death sentence facing him, Mr. Davis made the strategic
decision that he does not want to put on mitigating evidence in an effort to convince
the jury that he should not die." Len Davis originally intended to present a
"residual doubt" defense, whereby he would argue his innocence before the jury in
order to raise doubts in their minds as to his guilt, thereby eliciting a more lenient
sentence. However, Len Davis ultimately decided to forego presenting any defense
at all. United States v. Len Davis, 150 F. Supp. 2d 918, 920 (E.D. La. 2001).
9. "[T]he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who
deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct." Faretta, 422 U.S.
at 834 n.46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n.46.
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capricious death sentences, and (3) whether thepro se right includes
the right to present no defense.
This Note will provide support for the Fifth Circuit's holding by
addressing the abovementioned issues. Part I will present the District
Court and Fifth Circuit opinions in United States v. Len Davis. Part
II will involve a discussion of the Supreme Court jurisprudence
interpreting the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro
se and the Eighth Amendment prohibition of arbitrary and capricious
death sentences. Part IR will provide support for the Fifth Circuit's
holding by addressing the novel issues of this case. This part will
demonstrate that a defendant retains his pro se right even after his
conviction and that the Eighth Amendment does not preclude apro
se defendant from withholding mitigating evidence. This part will
also demonstrate that because the court has the resources necessary
to protect the government's interests there is no need to infringe on
a defendant's right to proceed pro se, even though the defendant
chooses to withhold mitigating evidence and present no defense at all.
PART I: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. LENDAVIS
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In 1995 the government charged Len Davis, a New Orleans police
officer, with hiring the murder of Kim Marie Groves, a witness
against him in a police brutality complaint. 0 After finding him guilty
of civil rights murder, a federal crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
:241 and 242, the jury found that the death sentence was appropriate.
,In light of this finding, the United States District Court for the Eastern
:District of Louisiana sentenced Davis to death.'" On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld Davis's
conviction on two of the three counts with which he was charged, but
reversed his death sentence and remanded the case to the District
Court for a new penalty trial.'3
10. Len Davis, 1995 WL 405707 (E.D. La.).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub
nom Davis v. United States, 530 U.S. 1277, 120 S.Ct. 2747 (2000). The Fifth
Circuit, having reversed Davis's conviction for witness tampering, held that because
the jury did not make a separate recommendation concerning the proper penalty for
each count of his conviction, it was impossible to know whether the jury's penalty
recommendations were not influenced by the fact that Davis had received three
convictions for which the death penalty could be imposed. Therefore, Davis's death
sentence was vacated and his case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
Causey, 185 F.3d at 423.
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B. The District Court's Opinion
At the beginning of the penalty trial Davis stated that he wished
to proceed pro se. In keeping with the Supreme Court's decision in
Faretta v. California,4 where the Court held that a criminal
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to voluntarily and
intelligently elect to proceed without counsel, Judge Berrigan allowed
Davis to proceedpro se. However, without objection, she appointed
standby counsel, a permissible act ofjudicial discretion recognized in
Faretta.5 Throughout the preliminary stages of the penalty trial,
Davis made it clear that he did not intend to offer any evidence
mitigating against the death penalty. 6 Before the trial began, Davis
filed a request to proceed with hybrid representation,' 7 whereby he
and his appointed counsel would take turns speaking on his behalf.
Though Judge Berrigan originally granted Davis's request, on
reconsideration she held that Len Davis had no right to hybrid
representation."8 However, she went further in holding that "Davis
does not have a constitutional right to self-representation at the
penalty phase of this capital case."
In holding that Davis had no right to proceed pro se in the
sentencing phase of his capital trial, Judge Berrigan relied on the
Supreme Court's language in Martinez v. Court ofAppeals,2 ° wherein
the Court declined to extend thepro se right to criminal appeals. The
Court's holding was based, in part, on the diminishing effect a
conviction has on a defendant's autonomy interests.2' Judge Berrigan
reasoned that because Davis had already received three convictions,
two of which had already been upheld, his autonomy interests were
outweighed by the government's interests in maintaining the fairness
and integrity of the trial.22 Thus, she concluded thepro se right does
not exist in a post-conviction sentencing trial.2
14. 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525.
15. Id. at 834 n.46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n.46. The court may appoint standby
counsel with or without the consent of the defendant so long as the defendant
maintains control over the case and is perceived by the jury to be representing
himself. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984).
16. Len Davis, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 920. In a later filing, Davis stated that he
would not present any defense at all during the penalty trial. Id. at 920.
17. See 3 Wayne R. LeFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.5(g) (2d ed. 1999).
18. Len Davis, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
19. Id.
20. 528 U.S. 152, 120 S.Ct. 684 (2000).
21. Id. at 162, 120 S.Ct. at 691-92.
22. Len Davis, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 922.
23. Id. at 923.
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In the alternative, Judge Berrigan concluded "that even if such a
right exists, it is overcome by more compelling Eighth Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment requirements that the death penalty not
be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously." '24 She rested this conclusion
on a series of Supreme Court decisions requiring individualized
sentencing in imposing the death sentence.25 Under this Supreme
Court jurisprudence, a sentencer must be allowed to engage in a
"particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and
record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him
of a sentence of death."2 6 Judge Berrigan feared that if Len Davis was
allowed to proceed pro se he would withhold from the jury these
relevant aspects of his record and character by offering no mitigating
evidence. Judge Berrigan reasoned that by doing so Davis would, in
effect, prevent the jury from being able to make an individualized
determination of whether to impose the death penalty. To allow
Davis to help the prosecution in this way, concluded Judge Berrigan,
would be to allow him to procure his own death, thereby committing
government-aided suicide. Thus, she revoked Len Davis's pro se
right and appointed counsel to present the mitigating evidence he
wanted to withhold.
C. The Fifth Circuit's Opinion
1. The Majority
After considering the arguments offered by Judge Berrigan in
support of revoking Len Davis'spro se right, the majority of the Fifth
Circuit concluded that Davis's right to proceedpro se should not have
been revoked.27 Judge Parker, writing for the majority, underscored
the importance of honoring a defendant's autonomy as mandated by
the Faretta decision. In addressing whether the Martinez decision should
be read as cutting off a defendant's pro se right upon conviction, he
reiterated that, in deciding Martinez, the Supreme Court drew a
distinction between trial and appellate proceedings not pre-conviction
and post-conviction proceedings. Moreover, he wrote confidently,
"[n]othing in Martinez can be read to push the ending point for the Sixth
Amendment right of self-representation in criminal proceedings back to
24. Id. at 919.
25. Id. at 924 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978)).
26. Furman, 408 U.S. at 286-91, 92 S. Ct. at 2750-53.
27. Len Davis, No. 01-30656, slip op. *7.
2002) 1303
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the end of the guilt/innocence phase of a bifurcated trial proceeding."2
Thus, concluded Judge Parker, Len Davis should have been allowed to
exercise his pro se right during the sentencing phase of his trial. 9
In addressing whether thepro se right recognized in Faretta extends
to capital cases, Judge Parker relied on the importance the Supreme
Court placed on individual autonomy. He did not agree with Judge
Berrigan's conclusion that, if Davis did have a pro se right, it was
outweighed by the Eighth Amendment requirement of an individualized
sentencing determination. In an attempt to quell Judge Berrigan's Eighth
Amendment concerns, Judge Parker suggested that the prosecution's
duty to bring out all evidence and the trial judge's right to question
witnesses would safeguard the need for an individualized sentence.3" He
also highlighted thepro se defendant's role in the trial, noting that "[tihe
jury will have the benefit of whatever defense Davis chooses to
mount."'" After commending Judge Berrigan for her "thoughtful
grappling" with the issue,32 Judge Parker concluded that, out of a respect
for Davis's autonomy, he should be allowed to proceedpro se during the
sentencing phase of his capital trial.3
2. Judge Dennis's Dissent
Judge Dennis was concerned with the fact that Len Davis was willing
to risk his life in order to carry out his plan.34 Though he shared Judge
Berrigan's opinion that Davis should not be allowed to proceed pro se,
he did not agree with Judge Berrigan's conclusion that Martinez should
be read as cutting off a defendant's pro se right upon conviction.3"
Judge Dennis read the Faretta opinion as recognizing the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense against the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Judge Parker's statement belied the fact that Davis had chosen to
present no defense at all.
32. Judge Parker phrased the issue as whether Faretta extends to capital cases.
However, as will become clear in Part III, though he correctly decided the issue as
he phrased it, he did not phrase it correctly. Thus, he left unanswered the more
difficult question, to wit: whether the Eighth Amendment precludes a defendant
from proceeding pro se even though he chooses not to fight the death penalty. Len
Davis, No. 01-30656, slip op. *6.
33. Id. at *7.
34. In his brief, Davis's counsel wrote, "[w]hile he [Davis] has no desire to die
he has weighed carefully the prospects of a death sentence against spending the rest
of his life in jail-and he finds life in prison to be more onerous." Len Davis, No.
0 1-30656, slip op., dissent 2 n.2 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (quoting an appellate brief
submitted by Julian Murray, appointed counsel for Len Davis).
35. Len Davis, No. 01-30656, slip op. *7, 4 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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prosecution. 36 According to Judge Dennis, because Len Davis was
helping the prosecution procure a death sentence he was not
exercising his Faretta right to present his own defense." He
emphasized, "[o]ver and over, the Court makes clear in Faretta what
the majority cannot see: the right is not to make a non-adversary non-
defense under the guise of a mere formalistic or nominal self-
representation; the right is to make a genuine adversary defense. 38
Judge Dennis viewed Davis's actions as distorting the pro se right by
turning it into a "constitutional right to mismanage, sabotage, or
abandon a defense."39 Thus, he concluded that the majority should
not have reinstated Len Davis's pro se right.
PART II
A. The Sixth Amendment Pro Se Right
1. Faretta v. California: the Jurisprudential Origin of the Pro
Se Right
In 1975, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a
fundamental right under the Sixth Amendment to proceed pro se.4°
rhe Court based its conclusion on the text of the amendment,
supporting its reading by way of reference to English and American
legal history." Though the Court admitted that the Sixth Amendment
does not expressly contain such a right, it argued that "the right to
self-representation-to make one's own defense personally-is thus
necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment."42 The court
reasoned that since the Sixth Amendment clearly states that the
accused shall have the right to notice, confrontation, and compulsory
process, it is the accused who should have the right to make his
defense personally.43 Underscoring the personal nature of the
amendment, the Court explained, "[t]he right to defend is given
36. Id. at 8-9.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525. The Court had already held that the
Constitution does not require an attorney be appointed against the will of the
defendant. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236(1942). The issue in Faretta was whether the Constitution forbids the states from
forcing an attorney on an unwilling defendant. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 815, 95 S.Ct.
at 2530.
41. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818, 95 S.Ct. at 2532.
42. Id. at 819, 95 S.Ct. at 2533.
43. Id.
2002] COMMENTS 1305
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directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the
defense fails.""
After concluding that the Sixth Amendment implies a right of
self-representation, the Court searched the archives of the common
law to find support for its reading. In sixteenth and seventeenth
century England, accused felons and traitors were forbidden to appear
before the courts with counsel. Though this prohibition was
eventually lifted,46 self-representation continued throughout England.
The long tradition of self-representation in criminal proceedings in
England found its way into the colonies, where the heart of the pro se
right beat with an undeniable contempt for lawyers.47 The Court
found that early Americans had evidenced their distrust for lawyers
through their laws48 and through their states' constitutions,49 many of
which vested defendants with the right of self-representation. These
sentiments, concluded the Court, were shared by the drafters of the
Sixth Amendment and, therefore, the last effect the drafters would
have wanted the Sixth Amendment to have would be to force
defendants to accept the assistance of unwanted counsel.5 Thus,
concluded the Court, the purpose of the Sixth Amendment was to
give defendants the choice to proceed with or without the assistance
of counsel.5'
According to the Court, although a defendant would not likely
present a defense as skillfully as his counsel, out of a respect for his
personal autonomy, he must be allowed to proceed pro se.52
Reluctant to distort the defendant's perception of the Constitution, the
44. Id. at 819-820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533.
45. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 823, 95 S.Ct. at 2535.
46. The Treason Act of 1695 granted, among other things, the right to court
appointed counsel for a willing defendant. Id. at 824, 95 S.Ct. at 2536.
47. "When the Colonies were first settled, 'the lawyer was synonymous with
the cringing Attorneys-General and Solicitors-General of the Crown and the
arbitrary Justices of the King's Court, all bent on the conviction of those who
opposed the King's prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure convictions."' Id.
at 826, 95 S.Ct. at 2537 (quoting C. Warren, A History of the American Bar 7
(1911)). "This prejudice gained strength in the Colonies where 'distrust of lawyers
became an institution."' Id. at 826-27, 95 S.Ct. at 2537 (quoting D. Boorstin, The
Americans; The Colonial Experience 197 (1958)).
48. In the 17th century, several colonies, including Massachusetts, Virginia,
Connecticut, North Carolina, and South Carolina, prohibited pleading for hire. Id.
at 827, 95 S.Ct. at 2537.
49. "After the Declaration of Independence, the right of self-representation,
along with other rights basic to the making of a defense, entered the new state
constitutions in wholesale fashion." Faretta;422 U.S. at 828-29,95 S.Ct. at 2538.
50. Id. at 832, 95 S.Ct. at 2539-40.
51. Id., 95 S.Ct. at 2539-40.
52. Id. at 832-33, 95 S.Ct. at 2540.
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Court wrote that "[t]o force a lawyer on a defendant [would] only
lead him to believe that the law contrives against him."" Justice
Blackmun, who was less concerned with the defendant's perception
of the Constitution, underscored the disadvantages of proceedingpro
se. Dissenting, he wrote, "[i]f there is any truth to the old proverb
that 'one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client,' the Court by
its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right on one to make
a fool of himself.
54
2. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California: Recent
Limitations on the Pro Se Right
In Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, the Supreme Court
held that a defendant's Faretta right to proceed pro se does not
extend to the appellate stage of a criminal proceeding." The Court
based its decision on the three inter-related arguments it had set forth
in Faretta: (1) an historical analysis of the pro se right; (2) a textual
analysis of the Sixth Amendment in light of its history; and (3) an
argument in favor of the pro se right based on the defendant's
autonomy rights. 6 The Court noted that though the history of pro se
representation in England may have been useful in the context of a
trial, it did not prove to be very helpful in the appellate context. In
Faretta, the Court relied on a long history of pro se representation in
criminal trials in England, but in Martinez, the Court found that there
was no appeal from a criminal conviction in England until 1907."
Though most of the States historically had some form of discretionary
appellate review, there was no generally recognized appeal as of right
until 1889, when Washington explicitly incorporated it into its
constitution. 8 Thus, concluded the Court, because there was no
traditional right to appeal a criminal conviction, the pro se right
preserved in the Sixth Amendment did not encompass the appellate
stage of a criminal proceeding.
In addition to a lack of historical evidence supporting a pro se
right on appeal, the Court pointed to the language of the Sixth
Amendment, which contains no reference to a criminal appeal.
Moreover, the Court noted that none of its cases protecting the rights
of indigent appellants had placed any reliance on the Sixth
53. Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2540.
54. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 592, 95 S.Ct. at 2550 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. 528 U.S. 152, 120 S.Ct. 684 (2000).
56. Id. at 156, 120 S.Ct. at 688.
57. Id. at 160, 120 S.Ct. at 690.
58. Id. at 159, 120 S.Ct. at 690.
13072002] COMMENTS
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Amendment.59 Thus, concluded the Court, because the Sixth
Amendment does not even apply to appellate proceedings, it cannot
be the source for apro se right on appeal.6"
The Court reasoned that because the Sixth Amendment does not
apply to appellate proceedings apro se right on appeal would have to
be grounded in the Due Process Clause." The Court reasoned that,
in the appellate context, because a defendant is not being haled into
the courtroom against his will as he was for his trial, a defendant's
appeal does not elicit the same autonomy concerns as his trial because
his presence on appeal is voluntary.6  "There are significant
differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal
proceeding," explained the Court, "the autonomy interests that
survive a felony conviction are less compelling than those motivating
the decision in Faretta."63 Thus, reasoned the Court, the autonomy
interests of a convicted defendant seeking an appeal are diminished.
On the other hand, the government's interest in maintaining the fair
and efficient administration of justice is just as strong on appeal as it
is during the trial. Thus, concluded the Court, "the States are clearly
within their discretion to conclude that the government's interests
outweigh an invasion of the appellant's interest in self-
representation. 64
3. The Eighth Amendment Prohibition ofArbitrary and
Capricious Death Sentences
The series of Supreme Court cases addressing the validity of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment began with Furman v.
Georgia.65 The issue in that case was whether the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. A plurality of the Court agreed that
to impose and carry out the death penalty under the statutes before it
would have been unconstitutional.6 ' Two Justices concluded that the
death penalty was unconstitutionalperse. 68 Three Justices, declining
to read the Eighth Amendment as altogether prohibiting the death
59. Id. at 160, 120 S.Ct. at 690.
60. Martinez at 161, 120 S.Ct. at 690.
61. Id. at 161, 120 S.Ct. at 690.
62. Id. at 163, 120 S.Ct. at 691.
63. Id. at 163, 120 S.Ct. at 692.
64. Id.
65. 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972).
66. Id. at 239, 92 S.Ct. at 2727.
67. Id. at 238, 92 S.Ct. at 2726.
68. Id. at 305-06, 370-71, 92 S.Ct. at 2760, 2793.
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penalty, concluded that the death penalty was constitutional only if
the legislature guided the discretion of the sentencer.69
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court refined its Furman decision,
holding that as long as sentencing discretion is "directed and limited"
so as not to create a "substantial risk that the death penalty [will] be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner," the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments are not violated.70
In an attempt to conform with the Supreme Court's holdings in
Furman and Gregg, many states enacted statutes limiting sentencing
discretion in death penalty cases. In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court was
presented with a death penalty statute that limited sentencing
discretion by only allowing the sentencer to consider three
enumerated mitigating factors. While recognizing the legislature's
role in deciding how much discretion to give the judge or jury
deciding the sentence, the Court noted that "it generally has been
agreed that the sentencing judge's 'possession of the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics' is '[highly] relevant-if not essential-[to the]
selection of an appropriate sentence ... ,72 Due to the lack of
corrective mechanisms available in redressing a wrongfully imposed
death sentence, the Court reasoned that the death penalty, by all
comparisons, is the most egregious penalty under the law. Relying on
the qualitative difference between the death sentence and all other
sentences, the Court declared that a greater degree of reliability is
necessary to impose a death sentence. " The Court reasoned that an
individualization of the sentencing process would increase the
reliability of death sentences by allowing for a meaningful basis for
distinguishing the cases in which it should be imposed from those in
which it should not be imposed.74 The Court argued that the
consideration of both mitigating and aggravating factors was essential
in adequately determining the appropriateness of the death penalty in
a criminal case. Thus, concluded the Court, "the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the
rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
69. Id. at 257, 310, 313, 92 S.Ct. at 2735, 2762, 2764.
70. 428 U.S. 153, 188, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976).
71. 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978); see Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 2929.04
(B) (1975).
72. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602-03,98 S.Ct. at 2963-64 (quoting Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083 (1949) (emphasis added by the
Court)).
73. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964.
74. Id. at 605, 98 S.Ct. at 2965.
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any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death. 75
PART Ifi
The District Court, the Fifth Circuit majority, and Judge Dennis
each had different approaches to the question of whether Len Davis
should be allowed to proceed pro se in his sentencing trial. Their
divergence was due, in part, to the way each of them phrased the
issue. Judge Berrigan, in her opinion, addressed two novel issues: (1)
whether under Faretta, and in light of Martinez, Davis had a right to
proceed pro se during his penalty trial; and, (2) if he did have a pro
se right, whether it was outweighed by Eighth Amendment concerns.
Judge Dennis, through a more straightforward approach, raised
another novel issue: whether the pro se right recognized by the
Faretta Court includes the right to present no defense.
The Fifth Circuit did not fully address the issues raised by these
two judges but phrased the issue more simply: whether under Faretta,
and in light of Martinez, Len Davis had a right to proceed pro se
during the sentencing phase of his capital trial. Though the Fifth
Circuit was correct in holding that Davis should be allowed to
proceed pro se, the opposing arguments were not given enough
weight and, consequently, were simply dismissed instead of
thoroughly rebutted. The following discussion will provide
additional support for the Fifth Circuit's holding through a critique of
the arguments offered by Judges Berrigan and Dennis.
A. The District Court Opinion
1. Whether Martinez Should Be Read as Cutting of the Pro Se
Right upon Conviction
Judge Berrigan read Martinez as completely cutting off a
defendant's prose right upon conviction. According to her, because
Len Davis's conviction reduced his autonomy interests, the
government's undiminished interest in maintaining the integrity of the
trial outweighed his pro se right. Thus, she concluded, Davis was
precluded from proceeding pro se by virtue of his conviction. In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Berrigan relied on language in
Martinez characterizing a defendant's autonomy interests as being
diminished upon conviction. Though the Martinez Court did make
the distinction between pre-conviction autonomy interests and post-
conviction autonomy interests, it did so in order to highlight the
75. Id. at 604-05, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65 (emphasis added by the Court).
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distinction between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal
proceeding. When a defendant voluntarily seeks an appeal, his
autonomy is not as threatened as it was in his trial when he was haled
into a courtroom against his will. Moreover, when a defendant
appeals his conviction he is not defending himself from the
prosecution but rather is attacking the prosecution's arguments and
seeking a reversal of the court's ruling. As the Court found in
Martinez, this distinction defines the boundaries of the procedural
protection the Constitution affords a convicted defendant on appeal.
Thus, when the Martinez Court characterized the autonomy
interests of a defendant as being diminished upon his conviction, the
Court was simply reinforcing its argument that, on appeal, a
defendant's autonomy interests are at their weakest. However, this
was not how Judge Berrigan read the Martinez decision. She
described the Court's holding as setting a threshold for the pro se
right at the point of conviction. Judge Berrigan portrayed the Court's
holding as one militating against the conclusion that a defendant
retains his pro se right after his conviction. In her analysis, she
quoted a passage from the Martinez decision, wherein the Court
stated that "the status of the accused defendant, who retains the
presumption of innocence throughout the trial process, changes
dramatically when ajury returns a guilty verdict."76 However, she did
not quote the sentence that followed:
We have recognized this shifting focus and noted: '[T]here
are significant differences between the trial and appellate
stages of a criminal proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage
from the State's point of view is to convert a criminal
defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt....'
By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the
State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend
off the efforts of the State's prosecutor but rather to overturn
a finding of guilt made by a judge or a jury below.'"
Judge Berrigan also quoted the Court as saying "the autonomy
interests that survive a felony conviction are less compelling than
those motivating the decision in Faretta."T But the sentence, as
76. Len Davis, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (quoting Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162, 120
S.Ct. at 691).
77. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162-63, 120 S.Ct. at 691 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 610, 94 S.Ct. 2437 at 2444 (1974)).
78. Len Davis, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (quoting Martinez, 528 U.S. at 163, 120
S.Ct. at 692).
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written by the Court, read, "[c]onsidering the change in positionfrom
defendant to appellant, the autonomy interests that survive a felony
conviction are less compelling than those motivating the decision in
Faretta."79
Reading Martinez as Judge Berrigan presented it, her conclusion
seems to be one compelled by logic. However, when read in its
entirety, the Martinez decision does not clearly stand for the
conclusion that a defendant loses his pro se right upon conviction.
Though her arguments in favor of revoking Len Davis's pro se right
were compelling, her reliance on Martinez as cutting off a defendant's
pro se right upon conviction was not warranted.
In Martinez, the Court made no distinction between pre-
conviction defendants and post-conviction defendants; rather, the
Court underscored the language of the Sixth Amendment as vesting
in defendants the right to proceedpro se in a criminal trial. Because
the penalty trial ordered by the Fifth Circuit is, in essence, merely a
re-determination of what the District Court should have determined
in the original trial, it follows that the penalty trial is part of the
original trial. Thus, Len Davis should not be stripped of his pro se
right because of his conviction, as he is still a defendant in a criminal
trial."0 Revoking thepro se right by virtue of his conviction would be
unfair, especially to Len Davis because his case was remanded due to
legal errors in his first trial. Thus, by stripping Davis of his pro se
right upon conviction the court would, in effect, be penalizing him for
something beyond his control. Moreover, if the pro se right was
automatically taken away from defendants whose sentences were
wrongly assessed at the original trial, courts would then have the
power to strip defendants of theirpro se rights by rendering sentences
highly susceptible to being reversed. Then, upon remand for post-
conviction proceedings, the courts, resting on the conclusion that a
conviction cuts off a defendant's pro se right, would be able to
prevent defendants from proceeding pro se. Though no court would
likely do this purposefully, the result would certainly undermine one
of the most important functions of the Sixth Amendment: to protected
79. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 163, 120 S.Ct. at 692 (emphasis added).
80. This proposition is illustrated best in the appellate brief filed by Davis's
attorney: "[Mr. Davis] is facing a trial in every sense of the word. The penalty
phase of any capital case is a trial in that there are opening statements, presentation
of evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, and closing arguments, but especially
so in the instant case. Here there is also the requirement for jury selection. Further,
even though guilt is not technically an issue, as a practical matter the government
is once again going to have to present evidence in an attempt to prove the
defendant's guilt. It certainly cannot expect jurors to return a death verdict if they
have no evidence before them as to what facts led to the conviction."
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defendants from the powers of courts."s Thus, the Fifth Circuit was
correct in holding that the Sixth Amendment vests thepro se right in
both convicted and unconvicted defendants.
2. Whether Eighth Amendment Concerns Outweigh Len
Davis's Pro Se Right
In concluding that Eighth Amendment concerns outweighed Len
Davis's pro se right, Judge Berrigan reasoned that, by foregoing the
presentation of evidence mitigating against the death penalty, Davis
would have been able to deprive the jury of its ability to make an
appropriate sentencing determination. In reaching this conclusion,
Judge Berrigan relied on Supreme Court jurisprudence requiring an
individualized determination of guilt based on a consideration of all
available factors, both mitigating and aggravating. To the extent that
Davis might have chosen to withhold exculpatory evidence known
only by him, Judge Berrigan was correct in assuming that he would
have been able to prevent the jury from hearing all mitigating
evidence. However, revoking Davis's pro se right would not have
changed this because Davis could have withheld that evidence even
if defense counsel was appointed to represent him. Moreover, the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a defendant from withholding
mitigating evidence, rather it prohibits governments, state and
federal, from preventing sentencers from hearing all mitigating
factors.8 2
Granted, it could be argued that by allowing apro se defendant
to withhold mitigating evidence, the judicial branch of the
government would, in effect, be preventing the sentencer from
hearing all available mitigating evidence. However, if this
argument was given full weight, the government would have to
81. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000); Jones
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (1999); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444 (1968); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 343 (Cooley ed. 1899).
82. In the Eighth Amendment cases Judge Berrigan cited, the government had
restricted the use of mitigating evidence through state statutes, court rules, or
evidentiary rulings. The focus of those decisions was on the information necessary
for an individualized determination of guilt, not the means by which that
information must be conveyed to the jury. See Furman 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct.
2726; Lockett, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909;
Williams, 337 U.S. 241,69 S.Ct. 1079; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct.
2934 (1989); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860 (1988); California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837 (1987); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,
107 S.Ct. 2716 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869 (1982);
Woodson v..North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976); Pennsylvania ex
rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 58 S.Ct. 59 (1937).
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force defendants to disclose all mitigating evidence in order to
comport with the Eighth Amendment. Volumes of case law would
likely proliferate due to the liberty violations that would necessarily
result from even attempting to meet this standard. When defendants
would choose to suppress exculpatory evidence by remaining silent,
it would be impractical, not to mention unconstitutional, to force
them to speak up. Forcing disclosure of all exculpatory evidence
known to a defendant would cut against the grain ofthepro se right,
which was meant to allow, inter alia, the defendant to choose what
evidence to present.83 Moreover, giving criminal suspects the right
to remain silent,84 only to strip them of that right once they become
criminal defendants, would create yet another inconsistency in
constitutional law.
To the extent that Len Davis would have been able to prevent the
jury from hearing mitigating evidence from other sources, Judge
Berrigan's concerns did not even apply because Davis's pro se
powers did not reach beyond the scope of his own case-in-chief.8 In
other words, though Davis did have a right to waive counsel and
control his own case, he did not have a right to waive justice and
control the courtroom proceedings by keeping all available mitigating
evidence from the jury. Though his pro se right necessarily entailed
the ability to prevent appointed defense counsel from presenting
mitigating evidence, it did not give him the right to prevent anyone
else from presenting mitigating evidence. At all times, the
prosecution, in accordance with its duty to seek justice rather than the
death penalty, had to comport with its duty to disclose all exculpatory
evidence within its possession.86 Len Davis had no power to prevent
the prosecution from presenting this evidence. 7 Furthermore, as a
federal judge, Judge Berrigan had at her disposal several resources
through which she could have brought out all available mitigating
evidence. She could have asked the witness questions in order to
83. The Court has stated that a pro se defendant should be given much
discretion in choosing how to mount a defense. See In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 92
S.Ct. 659 (1972).
84. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
85. Judge Berrigan recognized this limitation but still felt that Len Davis would
interfere with the jury's efforts at reaching an individualized determination
regarding his guilt. Davis, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 923, 930.
86. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). See also
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28,78 S.Ct. 103 (1957); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
79 S.Ct. 1173 (1959); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989 (1987)
(the prosecution has an affirmative duty to correct bad information).
87. Len Davis did, however, have a right to demand that the prosecution bring
forth information favorable to his case. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105
S.Ct. 3375 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972).
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clear up ambiguities in their testimony," she could have called her
own witnesses, 9 and she could have appointed an expert witness to
develop the mitigating evidence that the prosecution is required to
disclose.9" Most importantly, Judge Berrigan could have appointed
amicus curiae to bring out evidence mitigating against the death
penalty.91
There is one final consideration that would seem to foreclose any
further discussion on whether the Eighth Amendment requires an
attorney to be appointed against Len Davis's wishes. In Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution does not require the appointment of an attorney on a
defendant who does not want the assistance of counsel.92 In so
holding, the Court wrote that "the Constitution does not force a lawyer
upon a defendant."93 Thus, the holding in Adams-not to be confused
with the Faretta holding-seems inapposite to Judge Berrigan's
argument that the Constitution, via the Eighth Amendment, requires
appointment of defense counsel.94
The import of Adams notwithstanding, the existence of the
prosecution's duty to disclose all mitigating evidence and the trial
judge's broad discretionary powers provided the jury with a variety of
resources from which to gather the information needed to make an
individualized sentencing determination. Thus, Judge Berrigan's
Eighth Amendment concerns could have been dispelled by utilizing
these resources. Although the Fifth Circuit did not fully address
whether Len Davis's strategy violated the Eighth Amendment, it
reached the right result by holding that he must be allowed to proceed
pro se.
88. This falls within the broad powers vested in federal judges. See Quercia
v. United States, 289 U.S. 466,469, 53 S.Ct. 698, 698-99 (1933); United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1978 (1983); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 341, 345, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 615 (1943).
89. Fed. Rule Evid. Rule 614 (2001).
90. Fed. Rule Evid. Rule 706 (2001).
91. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000);
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1609 (1998). On remand,
Judge Berrigan appointed Laurie White as independent counsel to represent the
public interest in a full and fair penalty phase proceeding. Davis, 180 F. Supp. 2d
797, 2001 WL 1711023 (E.D. La. 2001). The Fifth Circuit subsequently held this
appointment to be in violation of Len Davis's Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation. U.S. v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2002), rehearing denied. The
United States Supreme Court has yet to grant a writ of certiorari on the matter.
92. 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236.
93. Id. at 279, 63 S.Ct. at 242.
94. See supra note 40.
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3. Judge Dennis's Dissent: Whether the Pro Se Right Includes
the Right to Present No Defense
According to Judge Dennis, the question of whether Len Davis
should have been allowed to proceedpro se was not a difficult one. As
Judge Dennis read Faretta, if a defendant wants to present his own
defense, the Sixth Amendment gives him that right, and if a defendant
does not want to present a defense, the Sixth Amendment does not even
apply. This conclusion was based on the Supreme Court's language in
Faretta and Martinez, and a strict reading of those decisions seems to
support Judge Dennis's distinction between pro se defendants who
wish to present a defense and those who do not.
As Judge Dennis pointed out, the Faretta Court repeatedly equated
thepro se right with the right to present one's own defense. However,
this was not without good reason. The defendant in Faretta had been
completely denied the opportunity to present his own defense.95 Thus,
the narrow issue presented before the Supreme Court in Faretta was
whether a court could prevent a defendant wishing to present his own
defense from proceeding pro se.96 Although Judge Dennis may have
been correct in concluding that Faretta did not recognize a right to
present no defense, this conclusion was not inconsistent with and,
therefore, did not militate against the conclusion that a defendant also
has apro se right to present no defense. In other words, by equating the
limits of the Faretta holding with the limits of the pro se right, Judge
Dennis was, in effect, arguing that when the Supreme Court recognized
a defendant's right to present his own defense the Court simultaneously
held that a defendant had no right to waive his attorney and present no
defense.97 This argument, which is implicit in Judge Dennis's dissent,
forecloses any further discussion on how much freedom of choice the
Constitution affords a pro se defendant.98 However, Judge Dennis's
position is not clearly supported by the historical and autonomy based
arguments the Faretta Court utilized to derive a pro se right from the
Sixth Amendment.
95. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 809-10, 95 S.Ct. at 2529.
96. Id. at 807, 95 S.Ct. at 2527.
97. The underlying rational to Judge Dennis's argument is similar to the all too
familiar Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the expression of the
one means the exclusion of the other"). See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts:
Crisis and Reform 282 (1985).
98. This reasoning seems inconsistent with the spirit of the pro se right. In In
re Little, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who chooses to represent himself
is "entitled to as much latitude in conducting his defense as we have held is enjoyed
by counsel vigorously espousing a client's case." In re Little, 404 U.S. at 555, 92
S.Ct. at 660.
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In Faretta, the Court made several references to a widespread
distrust of lawyers in the American Colonies, a distrust that
manifested itself in early laws and constitutions and made the
colonists' insistence upon a right of self-representation more
fervent.99 Additionally, the Court attached great significant to the fact
that self-representation in early American courts was the rule not the
exception. " After studying the history of thepro se right in colonial
America, the Court wrote that "the notion of compulsory counsel was
utterly foreign to [the Founders]. And whatever else may be said of
those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that
they understood the inestimable worth of free choice."''
Furthermore, the English common law references the Supreme
Court incorporated into its pro se argument demonstrated how
sharply opposed the defendant's interests were to those of the courts
in England. Drawing on those examples, the argument that the pro
se right was necessary to protect defendants from corrupt systems ofjustice was an easy one to make. However, the argument the Court
set out to make in Faretta-that the pro se right is just as important
even in the absence of a corrupt judicial system-was a harder
argument to make. Nevertheless, the Court analogized early English
courts, with all their inhumane and hegemonic pursuits, to twentieth
century American courts, where the effects of injustice and corruption
had long been diluted by the constitutional guarantees of liberty and
due process. By insisting that thepro se right remained viable despite
the presence of the government's compelling interest in ensuring that
there be a fair trial, the Faretta Court elevated the importance of the
defendant's autonomy to a new level. The Court had made a bold
leap from preserving the fairness of the trial at all costs to protecting
the autonomy of the defendant despite the costs. Therefore,
considering Faretta's departure from more conservative thinking, it
would be a small step for the Court to expand the right to present a
defense into a right to present one's own case without a defense.
The defendant's autonomy achieved new status after Faretta was
handed down. In fact, the Court placed the criminal defendant's
perspective of justice above its own."' In its concluding remarks,
99. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 826-27, 95 S.Ct. at 2537. The Court wrote, "[t]he
Founders believed that self-representation was a basic right of a free people.
Underlying this belief was not only the antilawyer sentiment of the populace, but
also the 'natural law' thinking that characterized the Revolution's spokesmen." Id.
at 830, 95 S.Ct. at 2539, n.39.
100. Id. at 828, 95 S.Ct. at 2537.
101. Id. at 833-34, 95 S.Ct. at 2540.
102. The Supreme Court plainly admitted that the pro se right seemed to "cut
against the grain" of its past decisions holding the right to counsel to be
indispensable. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832-33, 95 S.Ct. at 2540. Nevertheless, the
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while taking great care to note the disadvantages of waiving
assistance of counsel, the Court stressed the importance of avoiding
a result that would cause a defendant to believe that the law works
against him. °3 This concern was foreshadowed in the dictum of
Adams, which the Court quoted with approval:
What were contrived as protections for the accused should not
be turned into fetters.... When the administration of the
criminal law.., is hedged about as it is by the Constitutional
safeguards for the protection of an accused, to deny in him the
exercise of his free choice the right to dispense with some of
these safeguards... is to imprison a man in his privileges and
call it the Constitution."' 04
In addition to Judge Dennis's argument that Faretta did not give
Len Davis a right to present no defense, he also made a more practical
functional argument. Judge Dennis was concerned that by not
presenting a defense, Len Davis would undermine the adversarial
nature of the criminal proceeding.'0 5 He argued that if a defendant
were allowed to proceed pro se without offering a defense, the
prosecution's arguments would go untested by the defendant's
counter-arguments, leaving the court to decide a case based on the
presentation of the prosecution. Such a result, he correctly concluded,
would undermine the adversarial nature of the trial, a result that the
Faretta Court did not likely intend.
Since the only issue in the penalty trial was whether Len Davis
should receive a death penalty or a less severe penalty, the only
purpose of an adverse party would be to argue against the imposition
of the death penalty. Like Judge Berrigan's Eighth Amendment
concerns regarding the need for mitigating evidence, Judge Dennis's
concerns about the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings could
have been easily resolved by the appointment of independent counsel
to argue against the death penalty. Appointing amicus curiae would
not have prevented Len Davis from presenting his "non-defense" and,
therefore, would have preserved his pro se right without undermining
the adversarial nature of the proceeding. Therefore, Judge Dennis's
Court was adamant in holding that the defendant must be given the final say lest he
think the law "contrives against him" otherwise. Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540-41.
103. Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2540.
104. Id. at 815, 95 S.Ct. at 2531 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279-80, 63 S.Ct.
at 241-42).
105. Judge Dennis's concerns were valid because although a defendant may
remain adverse to the prosecution by virtue of his desire to be released from
custody, his adversity is cloaked by silence when he does not speak in his defense.
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concerns, though legitimate, could have been satisfied without
infringing on Davis's pro se right.
CONCLUSION
The potential conflict between the government's interest in fairly
imposing the death sentence and the defendant's interest in choosing
how to exercise his pro se right is one that will be the subject of many
legal discussions, even after the Supreme Court speaks on the issue.
What should be clear is that, considering the importance of a
defendant's pro se right and the equally important interests of the
government in fairly imposing the death penalty, the best result is that
which least infringes on the competing interests of the defendant and
the government. The prosecution's duty to disclose all mitigating
evidence and the trial judge's broad discretionary powers significantly
reduce the risk of an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. Thus,
due to the great importance of respecting a defendant's free will to
choose how to present his case, the pro se right should allow
defendants to withhold mitigating evidence and it should encompass
a defendant's right to choose whether or not to present a defense.
Shawn A. Carter*
* The author wishes to thank Professor John M. Devlin for his invaluable
assistance in writing this paper.
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